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Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures,
London: Profile Books, 1998.
In their introduction the authors write that their 'book is not against
political radicalism, it is against intellectual confusion. Our aim is not
to criticize the left but to help defend it from a trendy segment of
itself. The socialist leanings of the authors certainly give credence to
the latter claim. Although they deny that 'it is one more shot in the
dreary Culture Wars', this text will surely go down in history as a
major engagement of those wars, especially against poststructuralism,
postmodernism, and cultural relativism.
Sokal's famous 1996 parody, 'Transgressing the boundaries:
toward a transfonnative henneneutics of quantum gravity', published
in Social Text, is included as an Appendix. Reading it for the first
time with some knowledge of the controversy it has aroused I felt - as
a physicist and historian of science - not that it was a parody, but the
work of a Devil's advocate. The text is polemical and there are, indeed,
moments of deliberate parody, but generally the arguments seem quite
good. I was also surprised by the clarity with which quantum theory is
critiqued from a postmodernist perspective. I had been led to believe
that this article is sheer deliberate gobbledegook.
The chief weakness of the main text lies, I believe, in its heavily
polemical style. The very title 'Intellectual Impostures' is quite unfair
to those criticized, since I am not convinced by the passages quoted
that the authors they criticize are imposters. Indeed, there is every
reason to believe that they are altogether serious and sincere, which for
me makes matters far worse. It is not too difficult to understand, how-
ever, why Sokal and Bricmont are driven to polemic and accusat-ions
of dishonesty. Reading many of the passages quoted made me quite
angry, which is a curious reaction to a serious piece of scholarship.
Consider the following from Jacques Lacan (Ecrits, 1977): 'Thus
the erectile organ comes to symbolise the place of jouissance, not in
itself, or even in the fonn of an image, but as a part lacking in the
desired image: that is why it is equivalent to the -I of the signification
produced above, of the jouissance that it restores by the coefficient of
its statement to the function of lack of signifier (-I)'. Granting
problems of translation and removal from context, I felt that this text
and very many others in a similar vein, showed very little evidence of
the scholar's responsibility for clarity, and a striking lack of rigour or
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understanding of the technical scientific terms borrowed from
mathematics and physics. I think my anger was provoked mainly by
the assurance running through these texts that scientific terms are
being used with full rigour and understanding, and that the texts are
charged with profound meaning quarried with enormous effort from the
deepest mines of human undersanding. And yet it seemed to me that,
beyond occasional imaginative allusions, virtually nothing which
made any sense whatever was being said in the passages quoted. This
judgement must, in part, reflect the limitations of my knowledge, and
also, of course, my worldview.
The text apparently attempts to fulfil two functions, both to be an
acid scholarly critique and a populist attack. Many readers will enjoy
the almost limitless vocabulary of polemical terms drawn upon by the
authors. However, having criticized them for being so polemical, it
must be said that their powers of clear, measured and systematic
analysis are quite extraordinary and refreshing. Their ability to dissect
convoluted and obscure passages and identify key flaws almost led me
to forgive their polemics. Not entirely, however. I was also a little
surprised by a lack of any effort to relate the French traditions they
were criticizing to the enormous impact which mathematics and
imaginative literature have had on French scholarship generally.
Nevertheless, from beginning to end, I found this book hard to put
down.
There is a feature of the text that I find particularly encouraging.
Here we have two professional physicists who are highly eloquent,
widely read in the philosophy of science, sociology, French
structuralism and poststructuralism, and in much else, who are
nevertheless bringing something distinctively scientific to bear on
their analysis. This is an attitude to evidence, interpretation, and
knowledge which characterises much of science and which might be
termed critical common sense. I find this approach to cognition a
refreshing antidote to the philosophical scepticism and relativism
which pervades so much of Western intellectual life today. It is
heartening to see it re-asserting itself here so confidently and
perceptively. Much criticized for its cultural isolation from the
humanities, perhaps this very isolation has allowed a practical
common sense epistemology to survive and prosper in physics and
now to cross back into the humanities and to provide a much needed
alternative platform of understanding in areas such as social theorising
and the philosophy of science.
John Roche
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John Searle, Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in
the Real World, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999.
John Searle is widely regarded as one of the world's leading philosoph-
ers. Some years ago, he was the living philosopher most cited by non
philosophers, and exceeded Thomas Kuhn in number of overall citat-
ions. Searle's work on the theory of speech acts has had great influence
in linguistics, and his work on expression and meaning has influenced
literary scholars. Within philosophy, two of his views especially have
attracted enough admiration and enough attack that he need not have
written another word to be a leader in the footnote race. I allude to a
famous paper deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' and to Searle's Chinese
Room Argument. In the latter, Searle argues for the conclusion that
even if there were a computer that could 'translate' from English into
Chinese, this would not mean that intelligence had been recreated in
inorganic matter.
In several books, including his Reith Lectures, Searle maintains
that consciousness is a biological phenomenon and that it is a mistake
to suppose it can be reduced to or ultimately identified with states
described in the tenns of pure physics. Searle belongs to a growing
band of philosophers whose banner has inscribed on it: 'PHYSICAL-
ISM NO, NATURALISM YES'. The thrust of this retreat from
physicalism, is a matter of denying that biology, including neuro-
biology, can be given a physicalist reductionist treatment but a
naturalist will insist that this denial of physicalism is compatible with
the rejection of anything non-, or super-. natural meriting a place in
our explanation and understanding of the mind. I sum this up by
saying that the banner also has inscribed on it: 'NO SPOOKS
PLEASE.' And if banners could have asides, this one's would be 'We
are, after all, materialistic atheists'.
Such naturalism is comfortable in the van of ongoing enlighten-
ment secularization and Searle avows belonging in that van, character-
ising his book as a contribution to the continuation of the enlighten-
ment. No compunction in this book about being out of current
intellectual fashion. It is in the opening section of the book, 'Basic
Metaphysics: Truth and Reality', that we find most of the flag
waving, though the rhetoric does not get in the way of helpful
characterisation of the enterprise of philosophy, something Searle also
ends his book with. Searle is good on what philosophy is, especially
that way of doing it that is called 'analytic', and he is good at
defending analytic philosophy against those who long for philosophy
to serve spirituality or tell us what it all means, even if the price to be
paid is obscurantism. For Searle, precisely because philosophy is not
science, it needs to be, if anything, more rigorous. Near the end of his
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book, Searle writes: 'In philosophy there is no substitute for a
combination of original, imaginative sensibility on the one hand and
sheer intelligent, logical rigour on the other. Rigour without
sensibility is empty. Sensibility without rigour is a lot of hot air'.
The opening section of the book, 'Metaphysics: Reality and
Truth', engages the forces of darkness that threaten the continuation of
the Enlightenment, and contains sharp rebuttals of pragmatist, anti-
realist and postmodemist arguments which seek to convince us that we
say nothing true, or nothing to any point, or nothing interesting.
when we incline, as many of us still do, to say that inquiry and
reflection strive to, and sometimes do, arrive at thoughts that are true
or false depending on whether the world is or is not as such thoughts
represent it. There are facts to which true statements correspond, and
there are objects, properties, and relations to which our words refer.
Searle urges both correspondence to independently existing facts and
reference to independently existing objects as features of our
interactions with the world.
Searle's thought is distinctive in that he has long advocated that it
is an error to regard these ancient homilies as belonging to common
sense. Common sense. according to Searle, is a matter of beliefs such
as that if we want folks to be nice to us, we have to be nice to them,
or that if it is very humid, moderately high temperatures can be very
uncomfortable ('It ain't the heat, it's the humidity!'). But the existence
of a mind-independent reality and the referentiality of our talk and
thought belong to what Searle calls the Background. not to common
sense. It is the Background, because when we philosophise about it,
we have no choice but to talk in a way that makes it appear that we are
evincing deep seated beliefs, assumptions, or things taken for granted.
But the correct outlook is that these things lie so deep. or so far back,
are so much something whose denial never so much as occurs to us,
that no cognitive words such as 'believe', 'take for granted', 'assume',
'presuppose', 'be certain of, are appropriate. Wittgenstein in his late
work On Certainty is urging something akin to this. He might even
have touched on it in his early work when he made the enigmatic
distinction between what can be said and what cannot be said, but only
shown.
Searle characterises these Background matters as being or as lying
behind 'default positions', by which he means that those who dispute
them have to make the running in philosophical debate. It is not that
nothing can ever happen which might remove something from the
Background and put it up for grabs, even dispose of it. But it is so hard
to make this happen that those who challenge default positions have to
start the ball rolling and the rest of us only need to rebut challenges.
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Nevertheless Searle acknowledges that many of the great philosophers
got that way by attacking default positions and he hints that his own
attachment to philosophy is a little embarrassed by that.
Searle scrupulously, if a bit tongue-in-cheekishly, distinguishes
between rebutting the arguments of the anti-realists, postmodernists,
and so on, and cultural diagnosis of them and their proponents.
Diagnosis is called for because the arguments are so bad, even silly,
that it is hard to believe that they can be what sustains the fashionable
animus against an independent and objective reality. This reviewer,
anyway, is inclined to agree with Searle. I will leave it to those who
read this book to appreciate the detail of Searle's rebuttals and space
here to applaud and elaborate Searle's diagnostic efforts. It is this
aspect of his book which is, I think, of most interest to readers of this
journal.
Searle rightly remarks that the main impetus to idealism or anti-
realism has been that urging realism carries with it a problem about
whether the representations of reality we arrive at are reliable and true.
Along comes scepticism then, always there when philosophy is there,
but more prominent since Descartes imagined his powerful and
deceptive Evil Demon, and revivified by the Demon's contemporary
counterpart, the Brain in the Vat. Idealism, classically exemplified by
George Berkeley, overcomes scepticism by reducing the content of
claims about independent material bodies to the evidence for those
claims. Thus tables and chairs are understood by Berkeley and later
idealists or phenomenalists as really being more or less regular and
organised bits of sensory experience, something available to brains in
vats. J. S. Mill said that material objects were 'permanent possibilities
of sensation'. This also comes to reducing truths about what exists to
truths about evidence for them. Since scepticism thrives on the gap
between evidence and what it is evidence of, scepticism is thereby
overcome; but the price is idealism in one or other of its guises.
Searle, following one of his mentors, John Austin, is happy to
rebut scepticism with the observation that it is a mistake to infer from
the fact that two experiences are alike, while one is of something real
and the other not, that there really is no such thing as veridical
experience. For who says that in order to determine that experience A
was veridical and experience B was not, I may exploit only the
resources of the two experiences and not rely on further or prior tests
and observations? This is a developed version of the point, often made
against Descartes, that he appears to be inferring from the fact that any
experience can be deceptive to the conclusion that all experiences can
be. But this is a bad inference. No one would say that because any
runner can win the race, they all can. Anyone who thinks such a
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rebuttal is too simple is advised to see it in its glory in John Austin's
Sense and Sensibilia.
Searle observes that these days, the anti-realists (my tag for
pragmatists, idealists, linguistic idealists, social constructionists, post-
modernists) do not seem to lean so much on scepticism but on an
array of other arguments which are shot through with confusions.
There is, first, the argument that if you engage something from a
point of view or a perspective you do not really encounter reality.
Then there is the idea that since we have to use words to say what we
think, the things we think about are somehow linguisticized or (might
one say?) cultured (like a pearl!). Arguments of this genre are often
accompanied with sneer caps, as when we read of 'Reality As It Is In
Itself, that it is a notion to be dispensed with as adolescent in the
growth of thought through Hegel and the pragmatists to the wisdom of
various more recent luminaries such as John Dewey, Martin Heidegger
and Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. It is fair enough to confront all
this with Gottlob Frege's observation that, of course, you can't wash
the wool without getting it wet; but even so, you have no business to
infer that wool does not exist independently of being wetted.
Searle does not use the following example, but he ought to have.
It captures most of the point he is after about the way anti-realists
confuse words and the world. Some years ago (in the New York
Review of Books) I read: 'The Pacific Ocean was an invention of 19th
century cartography'. It is to me one of the mysteries of intellectual
life why some thinkers feel the urge to talk in such a silly way.
Cartographers do not invent oceans anymore than astronomers invent
galaxies. This point holds even though it is the case that dividing up
the waters of the earth into so many oceans, seas, lakes, ponds, and
puddles will lead to borderline cases, and some measure of convention-
ality, though it is almost certainly not as arbitrary as setting out the
borderlines among, say, the states of Australia.
Searle's rebuttals are effective. His diagnoses are intriguing. He
judges that the anti-realists are moved by a kind of detestation of the
idea of a reality to which their thoughts are answerable, some of them
seeing the idea of such a reality as the last bastion of the tyranny of
omnipotent and authoritative divine being. This dislike, in academic
life, especially involves a hatred of natural science. What better way to
put science in its place (or remove it from its place) than to say that
chemistry and physics, too, are texts and what they speak of not really
different from fictions (social constructions and the like) This animus
against science, Searle suggests, is not merely such, but a will to
power. Power is, in a sense, asserted over reality itself (it is a social
construction). But equality of status and power, within the academy
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and in society, is also sought, even if the way to get it is to reduce the
prestige of science.
It is worth remarking that Richard Rorty, the most famous
pragmatist walking the earth today and a frequent critic of Searle, is on
record as saying that the intelIectual credentials of literary criticism are
on a par with those of biology or physics. I once met a structuralist
literary analyst who insisted that her analyses of literary texts (or the
texts of matchbooks and T-shirts) were 'scientific' and that she had no
interest in questions of value, such as what makes Shakespeare so
much better than Joyce Kilmer, and no interest either in the claim that
Shakespeare is better. That conversation took place nearly 30 years ago
when structuralists in English departments were claiming kinship with
the objectivity of science. That 'us too' move was the beginning of
the envy of science that Searle speaks of. The first response to the
envy was to hold that literary enquiry and criticism was really
scientific. That failed, and the next response was to reverse direction
and hold that science was really literary. This has fared better as a
strategy and I have even met physicists who find themselves charmed
by the idea, especially if they have already been bewitched by Thomas
Kuhn.
What has gone on here is interesting. It used to be that the
humanities acknowledged a serious difference between what they did
and what natural science did; but this acknowledgment was not a
matter of accepting some inferior cultural status and there was no envy
or combativeness in it. It was a matter of the difference between the
growth of knowledge and the growth of sensibility. The humanities
also sometimes saw themselves as the institutional bearers of high
culture. Reason was respected and available all round, just as it is
available in ethical life via the difference between good reasons and bad
reasons for acting; or via the difference between feelings that are apt
(and in that way rational) and those that are not.
That happy accommodation was an offspring of enlightenment, no
doubt mid-wived by economic and political liberalism, with its
attachment to pluralism and tolerance. J. S. Mill's awakening to
poetry and overcoming of despair, at the hands of Wordsworth, are a
marvelous example of the possibility and importance of finding a
harmonious relation between science and sensibility. 'Only connect the
prose and the passion', says Margaret Schlegel in Howard's End.
Many of us who got our education in the fifties lived under this old
and happy dispensation. Many philosophers during the last 30 or so
years have been concerned to criticize those who see a far more radical
and sharp divide between reason and emotion than is justified.
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It is a sort of Romantic Revival, this envious hatred of science
that Searle diagnoses. Mill did not lose respect for Newton when he
gained so much from Wordsworth. But others, Keats and Blake in the
lead, Shelley not far behind, saw Newton as a great beast, a destroyer '
of sensibility, prophet of a meaningless and mechanical reality, no
decent abode for the spirit. Keats (here I follow M. H. Abrams' book
The Mirror and the Lamp), said that poets were the only real
discoverers of truth and, more famously, that truth was beauty).
Blake's loathing of Newton is well recorded. Mill was on the side of
mutual respect, as Coleridge seems to have been, and Wordsworth too.
But the depth of the divide between poetry and philosophy (which
should be construed in this context as including physics, whose name
used to be 'natural philosophy') has reasserted itself at the end of our
century.
It has done so in a remarkable way. No Keatsian claim to be the
only genuine seekers after truth, though perhaps a bit of Blakean
horror at the meaningless world urged by materialist philosophers.
Mainly what we are getting is a poisoning of the wells of rational
reflection and inquiry by casting suspicion on the motives and
putative power playing of those one criticises. Cultural studies, the
newest kid on the academic block, is making its way by claiming to
descry causes and motives behind ideas and arguments in a way even
more blatant than the Marxists and Freudians of yore. Marx and Freud
were as much offspring of the Enlightenment as Diderot, Darwin, and
Bertrand Russell. Their diagnostic moves would normally be prefaced
by evidence or argument of a straight kind against the positions or
theses they took issue with. Freud probably had an opinion of what
was unconsciously sustaining Jung in his views. But he urges the
superiority of his own theory in a way that conforms (well enough) to
the norms of objective inquiry and proper intellectual debate, even if,
with hindsight, we can see in Freud (as we almost always can with any
thinker) instances of blindness, oversight or pigheadedness in defense
of his own views.
I have devoted this review to the beginning and the end of Searle's
book. In between we are given succinct re-presentations of views for
which Searle is well known, written for educated nonphilosophers.
And well done it is. We are given his views on consciousness and
intentionality (the name given to the directedness or the 'aboutness' of
thought and feeling), and the centrality of this to the nature of the
mind as a biological phenomenon. We are given a good taste of Searle
on language and speech acts, for which, as 1opened by mentioning, he
is widely known outside of philosophy. Further, we get Searle on
human institutionality and on the constructed nature of social
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institutions (nothing to do, except via gross muddle, with the doctrine
of the social constructedness of reality) and the centrality of language
to the existence and nature of the social or the institutional. Searle
even has a go at explaining to us the nature of money, a mystery if
there ever has been one. This belongs to Searle's latest ventures
beyond philosophy of mind and language into the realm of philosophy
of social science. It is very useful to get clear about the difference
between things whose very existence and nature is constituted by our
minds and our practices, such things as votes and money, and things
which, while our having concepts of them is an outcome of human
life and mentality, nevertheless exist and have their nature independent-
ly of our minds; such things as rocks.
It is good to be clear about this because denying the difference
between ballots and boulders, or votes and rocks, is just what post-
modernists of various ilks are up to. It would be good if they stopped
it and perhaps a book like this one of John Searle's will slow them
down.
lloyd Reinhardt
The Letters of Wilkie Collins, 2 vols, ed. William Baker
and William M. Clarke, London: Macmillan; New York:
St Martin's Press, 1999.
When N. John Hall updated and upgraded Bradford Booth's 1951
edition of the letters of Anthony Trollope, in 1983, his object was to
make it 'as complete as possible', in emulation of the collections of
the letters and other papers of Thackeray, George Eliot, Dickens,
Elizabeth Gaskell, and George Meredith which had appeared during the
preceding four decades. Hall added nearly 900 'new' letters to the 932
that Booth had found, and transcribed in full over 300 that Booth had
chosen, or been constrained, merely to summarize. Sixteen years later,
Wilkie Collins has at last joined Trollope and the others. Sad to say,
however, and despite the definite article in its title, William Baker's
and William M. Clarke's The Letters of Wilkie Collins hardly does as
much for Collins - mutatis mutandis - as Booth did for Trollope back
in 1951. Because of 'pressures of space', the editors were able to
transcribe in full only 464 of the 2,223 letters they found; another 127
are summarized; and the remainder - no fewer than 1,632 - are merely
listed in Appendixes to each volume, with the date, recipient, topic,
and present location of each letter all indicated in a single line.
Knowing where all the untranscribed letters may be found will of
course afford scholars some consolation for the fact that such a
disappointingly small proprtion of the letters is actually reproduced.
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But this and the other infonnation we are given about them. terse as it
is. would obviously have been much more helpful if the names of the
recipients had been included in the Index of Correspondents. and if
those of people or titles mentioned in the laconic descriptions of the
'topics' had found a place in the general index.
In deciding which letters to transcribe in full. which to
summarize. and which to relegate to the appendixes. the editors appear
to have decided. no doubt rightly. to give priority to those which shed
the most light on Collins's private life and his own literary activities.
Thus in Volume 1. covering the years 1838 to 1865. nearly all his
letters to his mother are transcribed in full or summarized; so too.
until 1858. are all but a few of those to Charles Ward. apparently one
of the two closest friends of his youth. and a large selection of those to
the other: Edward Piggott. an important literary colleague in Collins's
young days. his sailing-partner from then until two years before his
death. and probably his closest confidant during the last twenty years
of his life. There are only four letters to Dickens. of which. oddly. the
first is merely summarized and another relegated to the appendix.
(Others presumably went up in the bonfires Dickens made of his
correspondence in 1860 and 1861.) Piggott. Ward. and Dickens all
knew about Collins's 'secret life' - his two mistresses and his
'morganatic' children - but then so did many other people. not all of
them personally acquainted with Collins: the letters relating to it have
all been thoroughly mined by recent biographers. as have the letters to
Collins's mother, a devout high-church Anglican who either never
knew about it or never let on that she did.
Many of Collins's letters to his publishers - Bentley. Smith,
Harper Brothers. Chatto, and others - are transcribed in full. We also
get several letters to Charles Reade. chiefly on stage and copyright
matters. and many to Collins's literary agent A. P. Watt. Most of
these shed light at least incidentally on his own literary activities but
very little on the literary scene generally. The commonest topic of his
letters is his own ill-health. whether making it impossible for him to
accept a social invitation or keep one he has already accepted. retarding
his progress on the latest instalment of a novel. or even preventing
him from attending a funeral (his mother's included). His
correspondents hear far more about the therapeutic properties of
calomel. colchicum. and laudanum (one of them. Charles Kent. even
being persuaded to try laudanum himself) than they do about his
opinions of and contacts with other novelists. He does not rank any of
his contemporaries among the 'kings of fiction' (Scott. Fenimore
Cooper, and Balzac) and. at least in the letters transcribed. he has
virtually nothing to say about any of them. apart from Trollope and
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Disraeli (after their deaths) and Mrs Henry Wood (because cheap
editions of East Lynne undeservedly outsold those of his own novels -
and at a higher price).
Looking through the lists of unpublished letters in the
appendixes, one cannot help wondering whether a different selection of
letters for transcription or summary might not have given a better
picture of the range of Collins's interests and personal and literary
friendships, and whether, with this object in view, more of the rather
repetitive letters to, for example, the Lehmann family and his
American friends Schlesinger, Seaver, and Winter might not have been
relegated to the appendixes. In their principal introduction to the
volumes the editors promise us letters to Lillie Langtry, Mary
Anderson, Squire Bancroft, and Trollope in which the 'full flavour' of
Collins's 'experience of writing and of stage craft' emerges; but none
is transcribed or even summarized. [ am a little surprised that no place
was found, either, for a letter as touching as the one he wrote to
Edmund Yates after Yates was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
unintentionally publishing a criminal libel: 'My dear Edmund,lAt such
a time as this, [ am not sure that it is a very considerate proceeding to
trouble you with letters. Let me only say that your old friend
remembers old times just now with more than customary tenderness. [
have read the Law report in this morning's newspaper with sincere
sympathy and sorrow'. Leaving aside particular cases, however, one
can fairly ask why so much higher a proportion of the letters Collins
wrote during the last twenty-three years of his life, after he had reached
the peak of his fame, is left unpublished than of those he wrote during
the preceding twenty-seven years.
Questions also arise about other aspects of the way in which the
editors - and to some extent the publishers - have performed their
tasks. The text has not been adequately proof-read and has far too many
typos and other blemishes, particularly for a work that purports to be
scholarly and that in some respects errs absurdly on the side of
pedantry - for example, by noting which particular letters in a word are
underlined: 'WC doubly underlines 'read' of 'bread'.' 'The 'oil' of
'boil' [is] underlined, and the 'oi' of 'boil' underlined twice'. Both
editorial insertions and conjectural readings are placed in square
brackets, as if the textual status of an editorially-inserted parenthesis
explaining that a 'locum tenens' is a 'temporary guardian of the place'
is the same as that of a word conjecturally forming part of the letter
itself: the reader often has to look twice to ascertain which is which.
Erasures by Collins are indicated by the notation 'erased word(s)', also
in square brackets, and at times the erasures, conjectural readings, or
other editorial insertions come so thick and fast that the text becomes
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almost impossible to follow. For example, 'fierce young gentlemen
with dirty faces blue blouses and beards whose [explaintive] [hairiness]
might put [indecipherable word] himself to the blush ... dirty old
houses deeply suggestive of vennin and three [indecipherable letters:
erred] woman's only to tell you what you already know'. Collins
himself describes one of his letters as 'rambling, scrambling,
scrawling', and his handwriting certainly can be fiendishly difficult,
but in a case like this - far from unique - would it not be better to
resort to a summary of the letter, omitting the indecipherable section?
And what textual justification can there be for supplying or
conjecturing words that simply don't exist: like 'explaintive' in the
first of the above passages, or 'hurrican[ors]', 'Malpheureux', and
'transpositive' elsewhere? (However bad Collins's handwriting, the
words he used must clearly have been 'hurricanoes', 'Malheureux ' and
'transpontine'.) In another case, that of the 'bore' who kept Collins
awake droning on about James and Horace Smith and 'the Rejected
[Add ... rs]', a glance at the Oxford Companion to English Literature
would have told the editors what the indecipherable word was.
For a work that will be used for reference purposes, both the
indexing and the footnoting leave much to be desired. Apart from the
lack of any index to the names and topics mentioned in the lists of
unpublished letters, the general index by no means includes all of the
references to the names and topics it does cover. And the footnotes are
both sparse and prone to error. If it was worth explaining what 'locum
tenens' means, could it safely be assumed that readers would know
what Queen Victoria did when she 'Duke of Yorked us' (in August
1844), or which of Sterne's novels was set in France, or who the
'Henry' referred to on p.232 is, or what the joke is when the English
call Taine 'An Ass' (or should this read 'You Ass'?). Several footnotes
contain errors resulting from inadequate proof-reading (transposed
numbers in dates, for example). At least two others confuse young
men with their more illustrious fathers: Thomas Hood and Baron
Tauchnitz respectively. Another footnote, on a reference to 'Art -
Unionites [sic]' in the Royal Academy, clearly misses the point, as, I
suspect, do some of the editors' introductory comments on particular
letters: surely Collins has his tongue in his cheek when he tells
George Bentley that he 'sides with Bright' on the subject of the
Crimean War; and the 'pious bitch' he refers to in another letter is
surely not an unidentified 'tenant', as the editors say, but a cousin, a
legatee of his father's.
The editors found 140 letters in the Mitchell Library, Glasgow but
missed the two Collins letters, to Marcus Clarke, in the Mitchell
Library, Sydney - both concerning Clarke's stage adaptation of The
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Moonstone: I discussed them in a note, 'Charles Reade, Wilkie
ColIins, and Marcus Clarke', in Australian Literary Studies, I I
(1984).
Peter Edwards
Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre
of Political Ontology, London and New York: Verso,
1999.
For the last twenty-five years or so aesthetics as it has been
traditionally conceived has been undermined by trends in theory
influenced by French poststructuralist philosophies of the 1960s and
1970s. This process has gone so far that it is now commonplace to
meet demands that aesthetics should be abolished, and replaced by
discourses concerning politics, ideology, and desire. One trend,
influenced by Althusserian Marxism, sees aesthetics as ideological
mystification of class relations. Another, influenced by Nietzsche and
Foucault, sees aesthetic values, like alI values, as the impositions of
dominant social groups, and as the mediations of their power. A third
trend, inflenced by the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan, and
prominent in Cultural Studies (itself the displacing rival of 'literature'
disciplines), offers to conceive both works of art and the fictions of
popular culture as the products of the 'impossible' relations of power
and desire between human 'subjects'. AlI these trends have had a toxic
effect on aesthetics because of their Nietzschean hostility to the
holistic categories bestowed on aesthetics by Idealism and
Romanticism: totality, organic whole, harmony, reciprocity,
plenitude, closure, and the rest. More specificalIy, they have alI tended
to see works of art and aesthetic discourses as active in the ideological
constitution of the subjectivity of individuals, an unhappy process in
which human beings are 'subjected' by colIective representations
(discourses and imagery) to the condition of being a 'subject', with alI
the illusions of autonomy and self-unity that this implies. In this
situation it may be useful for those interested in aesthetics to examine
Slavoj Zizek's latest offering on the subject of the Subject, especialIy
as he claims to be vindicating the universal human Subject so much
attacked by poststructuralism, and more latterly by postmodemism. Is
Zizek giving us a restabilized concept of the Subject on which
aesthetics could be more securely based?
WelI, no. Zizek is himself a Lacanian, and his Subject is just as
decentred, and heteronomous, given to ilIusions of plenitude, and so
on, as that of poststructuralism in general. The real significance of this
book for those of us concerned with the autonomy of aesthetics is that
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it launches a civil war against its own poststructuralistlpostmodemist
subculture. Zizek's personal motto is 'Include me out!' For the rest of
us 'Know your enemy' is still a good maxim.
Zizek claims, specifically, to be defending the Cartesian subject.
But this is transparently a joke, since he admits immediately that it is
not the Cartesian cogito that he wishes to defend, but its hidden core,
'a certain excessive moment of "madness" inherent to cogito' (p. 2), in
other words the Lacanian concept of the Subject, or, to be precise,
Zizek's leftwing version of that. One of the sources of irritation with
this book is the need to cut through the layers of misleading assertion
to get at what exactly is being argued.
The general aim of the book is political. It argues for Lacanian
psychoanalysis as a basis for a renewed left radical politics. Zizek's
own politics are (or at least seem to be, on the surface) socialist, and
much of the book is a polemic against global capitalism, its commod-
ified culture, and its ideological counterpart, liberal-democratic multi-
culturalism. However, Zizek, a Slovene, rejects orthodox Commun-
ism, and offers us instead what he regards as the 'true' dialectical
materialism. He also sees himself as a Leninist, although 'Leninism'
is also to be redefined. As with so much poststructuralist discourse,
canonical authorities are to be rewritten, both saluted and betrayed in
the same discursive gesture.
Zizek engages with various philosophers and philosophical
currents influential at present in the philosophy of the subject, in
political philosophy, and in social and cultural theory, including the
theory of gender. The book is divided into three parts. In the first part
he is concemed with Heidegger, Kant, and Hegel; in the second part
with the post-Althusserians Alain Badiou, Emesto Laclau, Etienne
Balibar, and Jacques Ranciere; in the third part with Judith Butler, with
the theory of contemporary society as the 'Risk Society', and with
postmodemism. With most of these thinkers and positions his critique
takes the form of a triple movement: he takes from each something he
values (translating it into his own Lacanian terms); he dissociates
himself (or strives to do so) from the rest; he then connects what he
has taken with own Lacanian views.
Unfortunately Zizek does not expound his own ideas in one place,
in a single coherent exposition. On the contrary, his ideas emerge
intermittently, bit by bit, as a by-product of his criticism of other
thinkers and doctrines. This leaves the reader to piece together the
fragments of Zizek's position, and the book rambles so much that one
cannot be sure that one has fitted everything together (or indeed that
Zizek has done so).
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Part One opens with a discussion of Heidegger and Kant. From
Heidegger Zizek wants to take the notion of an authentic act, but he
finds the nature of this act in Kant rather than in Heidegger. He
criticizes Heidegger for recoiling from what Kant supposedly offers
concerning the nature of such an act. What Heidegger is said to recoil
from is Kant's notion of transcendental imagination, at least as
interpreted by Zizek. For Zizek finds the 'secret' of transcendental
imagination to be the 'abyss of radical subjectivity'. Zizek stresses the
negative, destructive aspect of transcendental imagination rather than
its positive, synthetic aspect. And he identifies this 'power of the
negative' with the early Hegel's 'night of the world', the capacity of
the Imagination (in the later Hegel, the Understanding) to withdraw
from the world of experience and to break it down into fragments (in
thought). This is for Zizek the essence of freedom, and the ultimate
basis of any political emancipation. And so, with Hegel, Zizek sees
negativity as the essence of the Subject. From this context of German
Idealism we leap to Lacanian psychoanalysis, for Zizek identifies, or
analogizes, all these notions of negativity with Freud's death-drive.
The death-drive, while horrifying as a negative power, is offered to us
positively as the real possibility of social revolution. (Hegel's power
of the negative is also analogized to Descartes' 'bracketing of the
world' - hence the show of defending the Cartesian cogito.)
Hegel, in the second chapter, is treated in a different manner from
the other thinkers discussed. Instead of endorsing and critiquing, Zizek
asserts what he takes to be the all-important truth of Hegel's
philosophy, and defends Hegel from alleged misreadings. However,
Zizek is so concerned to focus on the moment of negativity in Hegel,
and to neglect the positive moment, that his account of Hegel involves
much not very convincing rewriting. For example, there is nothing
holistic in Hegel. The Absolute Subject is not an organic totality. The
negation of the negation is not a positive, restorative moment, merely
another and more radical negative. Hegel is then translated into
Lacanese (e.g. the movement of the universal through self-division in
order to become actual or concrete =the Lacanian 'forced choice', the
choice where only one alternative is a real possibility). And finally he
is to be supplemented by Lacan. Zizek says he wishes to revise
Hegel's Logic (don't we all?) by adding books on intersubjectivity and
'absolute logic'. These would be, respectively, the 'logic of desire' and
the 'logic of drive'. So what at first seems to be an endorsement of
Hegel's philosophy turns out to be an indirect way for Zizek to offer
us his own Lacanian views.
Part Two begins with a discussion of Badiou. Badiou is a
Christian philosopher (a 'reader' of Saint Paul), who, it seems, wishes
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to revamp Christian existentialism with notions drawn from Marxism
and deconstruction. From Badiou, Zizek wants to take two things: (i)
the notion of a Truth-Event, which goes beyond the limits of the
existing social (and symbolic) order, and to which one must be
faithful; (ii) the existentialist notion of an ontological gap between
human freedom and the positive order of the world. The former of these
is analogized by Zizek to the idea of loyalty to the memory of the
Bolshevik Revolution. The latter is necessary to Zizek to avoid what
he takes to be the Communist error of offering to speak as the 'voice
of the cosmos' - this, according to Zizek, can only lead to totalit-
arianism. But while existentialism offers Zizek these notions with
which his own ideas have some affinity, it is also hostile on principle
to psychoanalysis because the doctrine of the Unconscious appears to
undermine human freedom. So Zizek must do some more fancy
footwork to dissociate himself from this aspect of existentialism, and
to vindicate Lacan from Badiou's critique of psychoanalysis. Inevit-
ably, the existential free act of Badiou is to be translated into the
Lacanian 'act proper'. And Saint Paul's Love, which supersedes the
Law, is analogized to the death-drive which has the power to suspend
the Law in the Symbolic Order.
Part Two continues with a discussion of politics, and engages
with Ranciere, Laclau, and Balibar. Like them, Zizek wants to revive
the notion of politics as a specific kind of activity, not grounded in
ethics, and not to be rejected by ethics. He sympathizes with
Ranciere's politics of mass protest, the revolt of the excluded and
marginalized, who insist that it is they who are 'the people'. He also
endorses Laclau's notion of ideology as a struggle for hegemony
between particular social groups, all of whom wish to present
themselves as 'the universal'. This kind of politics derives from the
petty bourgeois radical democracy of the French Revolution, and
doesn't obviously have anything in common with the Marxian
socialism to which elsewhere Zizek seems to express adherence. But
inside this form he wants to posit a different content, a universal
restructuring of social relations. So we seem to have a Marxian
content dressed up in the trappings of the French Revolution. I'll
comment on this oddity later. Meanwhile, it does at least explain why
he rejects Balibar's preoccupation with merely reviving the liberal
public sphere (and Zizek is uniformly critical of Habermas throughout
this book). What Zizek wishes to contribute to this democratic
perspective is a psychoanalytical dimension. Such an oppositional
politics is said to require the overturning of the collective Symbolic
Order, and to this end Zizek invokes Lacan's doctrine of 'traversing the
fantasy', that is, undoing the basic fantasy that supports the symbolic
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space within which individual subjects are located, and given their
social identities.
With politics in general, then, Zizek has at least something
definite and discussable to offer, whatever one may think of it. His
engagement with the politics of gender is not so happy. In the first
chapter of Part Three Zizek engages with Judith Butler. Butler has
attacked Lacan, as well as Freud, for being socially conservative and
patriarchal. It is difficult to see how these charges can be denied, but
Zizek has to try, if he is to vindicate his own view of Lacanianism as
a new basis for radical politics. It seems to me that Butler's challenge
is the strongest that Zizek has to meet, and that this chapter is the
weakest in the book. Zizek gets himself entangled trying to
distinguish real sexual difference from sexual difference as legitimated
in the Symbolic Order. This seems to be a distinction difficult to
sustain without lapsing into essentialism, and much of Zizek's
discussion here seems to be waffle. Butler's strength is that she meets
Zizek on his own psychoanalytical ground, and is thus able to expose
his weak points, at least in the theory of gender.
In the last chapter Zizek is concerned with the state of
contemporary society and with postmodernist culture. His starting-
point is the decline of paternal authority, and with it the authority of
the Symbolic Order. He associates this with the decline of belief in the
'modem' God of Descartes, a being whose act of pure will opens up
the space for rationality and science. As this god has retreated, his
place has been taken by the neo-pagan divinities of New Agism's
resexualization of the cosmos ('Men are from Mars, women from
Venus', etc). The psychological correlate of all this is that Freud's
Oedipal subjects have been replaced by narcissistic post-Oedipal
subjects. Zizek is not very clear on this point - he says different
things in different places - but I think he regards some of us as
perverts, and others as hysterics, the hysterics being encouraged into
dependency by the shift of the therapeutic function from the family to
public institutions. At one point, he suggests that perversion and
hysteria are connected in a loop, a kind of vicious circle, in which each
is the unsatisfactory escape from the other. The decline of collective
beliefs and values has brought us into the Risk Society (as expounded
by Ulrich Beck, and by Anthony Giddens), where there are no generally
accepted principles with which to deal with the novel problems of
global warming, nuclear waste, and so on, and where any rational
solutions we work out remain uncertain, because we cannot know
enough about the consequences of any actions we take.
Eventually, though, Zizek backtracks to the traditional Marxist
position that such problems are restricted to a capitalist society. And
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against all the New Agers, against all the postmodernist celebrants of
perpetually mobile social identities, against the Foucault who endorses
the 'polymorphously perverse' as a mode of subversion - against all
this fashionable intellectual rubbish he asserts that psychoanalysis and
Marxism can still help. But although he sees himself as radical, Zizek
sometimes sounds defiantly conservative. Like Robert Hughes he
disapproves of the 'culture of complaint' (as a fonn of hysteria). The
postmodernist pursuit of a guilt-free and endlessly variable sexual
pleasure will end, he says, in boredom and sado-masochism. Perpetual
self-refashionings only conceal the nothingness within. All sexual
relations involve an element of harassment, so complaints of sexual
harassment are misguided. He even constructs a psychoanalytical
argument to prove that we are all a priori guilty.
Zizek's solution for all this is not the conservative one of
restoring the authority of the Symbolic. He goes to the other extreme.
He wants that radical negative act that abolishes the Symbolic Order
altogether, a 'traversing of the fantasy' that releases one from one's
bondage to an imposed social identity. So, this is psychoanalysis in
the mode of anarchism. Astonishingly, his exemplar of this stance is
Mary Kay Letourneau, the schoolteacher who had sex with her fourteen
year-old pupil. Zizek sees her as following her desire, not compromis-
ing it, acting in passion gloriously against what she knew to be right.
She traversed the fantasy, and freed herself from the symbolic space of
fixed social identities. (Hm. How does Zizek know she wasn't acting
out the fantasy, rather than traversing it?)
Generally, the criticism of other authors and positions is what is
strongest in this book. Its weaknesses are its own theory and method.
As criticism it is acute, stylish, and often amusing. Zizek has the
postmodern panache of being able to refer to Hegel and Julia Roberts,
if not in the same sentence, at least in the same paragraph. But he also
comments in a lucid, sober, scholarly way on the relations of Kant and
Heidegger; his Lacanian concepts work well in the analysis of the
mystifications of ideology and media images; and he says wittily many
things that need to be said about the follies of postmodernism. As I
have said already, he is weakest on Judith Butler, and perverse on
Hegel.
His own theory is radically self-stultifying - which is a pity, as
he often seems to be a decent fellow capable of a commonsense
realism. But his stress on negativity is so one-sided that it is hard to
see how it could possibly be connected with any effective politics,
radical or otherwise. In theory, he values the moment of popular
protest, the moment of revolutionary disorder between regimes. just as
in practice he values the 'interregnum' in Yugoslavia between the
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demise of Communism and the restoration of capitalism. He regards
all social orders as imposed by violence. and as closing off the freedom
which for him is only negative. This is clearly anarchism, and not
socialism. But it is a gloomy, self-conscious. Stoical kind of
anarchism that has lost hope in moving towards any real, permanent
state of social emancipation. Things go from bad to worse, says Zizek,
and we must be prepared to assume responsibility for that worse. If he
knew the Bolshevik Revolution was going to end in Stalinism, he
would still go ahead and make the revolution. Zizek's politics, then, it
seems to me, end in irrationalism. He privileges destruction, if only
because he cannot see any way forward to achieve a new construction.
The parallel, and indeed the ground, of all this is in Zizek's
Lacanian psychoanalysis. This. too, privileges the 'power of the
negative'. One must traverse the fantasy. undo the Symbolic Order,
pursue one's desire, even if it ends in destruction. Lacan's own
example here is Sophocles' Antigone, who defied Creon and the law of
Thebes in order to bury her brother. But Antigone finally killed
herself, while the Theban social order carried on - just as Mary Kay
Letourneau went to prison. and the US laws on sexual offences against
minors remain in place. Zizek says that one must accept that the
'authentic act' may result in catastrophe and self-obliteration. Well,
yes. But how does this sort of mad suicide help the cause of political
emancipation? Zizek's anarchism in politics is, then, grounded in a
psychoanalysis in the mode of an extreme, perverse Romanticism:
passion is good, rational self-control bad. The contradictions are
obvious. We must dissociate the ethical from the Good, asserts Zizek.
On the other hand, following one's passion is said to be a duty.
Zizek has many good passages of Marxist criticism of capitalism
and its culture, but these remain floating in the air, ungrounded in any
Marxist theory. Indeed. Zizek rejects explicitly all of Marx's major
doctrines. Zizek doesn't believe in scientific socialism, a planned
society, or the withering away of the state. He rejects Marx's notion of
the socio-economic constitution of classes. and wants 'proletariat' to
be a group label to be adopted by anyone who wants to join in. He
reduces dialectics to negativity. And he turns materialism and idealism
inside out: 'materialism' is now rejecting the idea of any hidden
structures behind appearances - by this phenomenalist criterion, Marx
and Engels were idealists. Zizek wants to reject classical Marxism.
while continuing to call himself a Marxist. This schizophrenia
explains his desire to embrace a petty-bourgeois democratic politics,
while calling for a total restructuring of social relations. Zizek would
like the latter, but he cannot really believe in its possibility. So he
clings to the former. The protest itself is the thing. There are many
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places in this book where the shadow of Bernstein looms: the
movement is everything, the goal nothing.
Zizek wants to be on both sides of the freedom vs detenninism
divide. As a Nietzschean he wants to speak in the discourse of freedom
and authenticity, of 'the act', and of responsibility. All this seems to
presuppose human autonomy. On the other hand, as a (post-
)structuralist he wants to reduce human agency to an 'effect' of
structures. He speaks explicitly of the decentred human subject that
lacks autonomy, but in existentialist mode he seems to presuppose the
very autonomy he denies.
He is also entangled with the conscious and the unconscious.
Against Foucault and Badiou he wants to insist on the existence of the
Unconscious. On the other hand, his whole ethico-political discourse
is in terms of choice and 'the act' - these seem to presuppose
conscious activity. It is hard to see how the death-drive, a structure of
the Unconscious, can be deliberately activated in order to set in motion
revolutionary activity. Zizek falls back on the ambiguous concept of
spontaneity. But if the operation of this spontaneity is a matter of
contingency and chance, as Zizek asserts, how can it be depended on as
a motivation for revolutionary politics, or indeed any politics?
These theoretical aporiae arise because Zizek makes no attempt to
think through his own views systematically. He is indeed one of those
modern Romantics who are opposed on principle to systematic
thought (hence all the emphasis on negativity, and the refusal of
Hegel's third moment of positive, speculative reason). But this means
that in his own exposition he cannot get beyond thinking in analogies.
And eventually all analogies lead to Lacan. Over and over again he will
use a sentence of the form: 'But is not this x in ... (Hegel,
Heidegger, Butler, whomever) really the y in Lacan?' To which one
can only reply that, if theoretical tenns take their meaning from their
theoretical context, then, no, it isn't. This sort of self-serving
'translation' isn't new. It goes back to Feuerbach. But it seems to have
been pervasive amongst the left intelligentsia for a generation. As a
mode of theoretical construction it is blatantly preposterous, but like
other absurdities it continues to flourish. Zizek wants to contribute a
new theoretical basis, not just for cultural criticism, but for revolut-
ionary politics. But when one comes to examine what is offered, there
is no theory, there are only fragments, tendencies, dogmas, just
jostling each other, and at the fundamental level cancelling each other
out. This is futile.
What finally of aesthetics? It is apparent from Zizek's work that it is
not all the categories of aesthetics that are rejected by Lacanianism. It
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is only the categories associated specifically with beauty (organic
whole, harmony, plenitude, and so on). By contrast. the categories of
the sublime and the monstrous have their own place within
Lacanianism. The sublime corresponds to that experience of excess,
that pleasure-in-pain, which isjouissance. And the monstrous (already
illustrated by Lacan with the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch)
corresponds to the 'night of the world', the capacity of radical
subjectivity to divide. dissolve, fragment. All this seems to imply
Romanticism against Classicism (the fragment vs the perfected work.
the open vs the closed. the mobile vs the fixed). But equally. it seems
to be one side of Romanticism against the other (the fragmented vs the
organic, the Gothic vs the idyllic, the sublime vs the beautiful). The
truth of this combination of antagonisms would seem to be
Surrealism, with which Lacan was associated in the I920s and 1930s.
So it would seem that beneath an attack on aesthetics in general the
ground for a particular style of aesthetics is being insinuated.
However. there is still a complication. Aesthetics on one side, and
what belongs to the non-aesthetic practical sphere on the other seem to
have changed places and functions. Zizek notes that in the Risk
Society ethical judgments - that is, all judgments concerning what is
right, good, or lawful - have taken on the character of aesthetic
judgments. We can no longer subsume the particulars under a known
universal. because all traditional beliefs and values (it is said) have
disappeared. Rather, with each concrete situation we must invent a new
universal under which it may fall, as if we were criticising a uniquely
beautiful scene or a work of art. So, it seems that aesthetics has given
its formal character to ethics and politics. while ethics (as all that
concerns desire) and politics have given their content to aesthetics.
This is a knot that will have to be undone.
Despite the negative criticism that I have levelled at Zizek, I still
want to recommend this book. Zizek's views are undoubtedly mad, but
his madness is touched with genius.
Great wits are sure to madness near allied,
And thin partitions do their bounds divide.
Anyone interested in aesthetics. literature disciplines, or cultural
studies should read this book - if only to observe the intellectual
history of the last third of the twentieth century spiralling towards its
self-destructive climax.
David Brooks
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